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In t:he Supreme Court:
of the State of Utah

E. S. WILSON,

Plaintiff, Respondent
and Cross-Appellant.
vs.
WEBER COUNTY, a public corporation
of the State of Utah,
Defendant, Appellant
and Cross-Respondent.

APPELLAJ.~T'S

No. 6195

REPLY BRIEF

The questions involved as set out in the cross-appellant's
brief are:
1. Does respondent's complaint state facts sufficient in its "first cause of action," to constitute a cause
of action against appellant?

(a) Is an allegation of payment of the moneys
under protest necessary to complete a full allegation
of said cause of action?
(b) Is it necessary to allege the presentation and
rejection of a claim against Weber County pursuant to
the provisions of Section 19-11-10, R. S. U. 1933?
2. Are respondent's second and third causes of
action on their face barred by the provisions of Section 104-2-30 R. S. U. 1933?
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(a) When does the period of limitation begin to
run on respondent's causes of action?
( 1) Is prior demand a necessary part of respondent's cause of action?
( 2) If prior demand is a prerequisite to action,
may a claimant indefinitely delay making demand?
( 3) If the claimant may not indefinitely postpone
the running of the statute by delaying demand, when
will the period begin to run in the absence of a demand?
ARGUMENT
The appellant of this brief will not make an extended
discussion of the first question as we consider that our brief
on the appeal covered that.
As to the second and third causes of action involved, in
Question 2, Subdivisions thereof, it may be assumed for the
purpose of argument only that in these two causes of action
the first question is not involved as we are particularly anxious
to have a definite ruling as to both points of law, and that the
consideration of them separately insures the separate rulings.
In order to have it definitely before the minds of the
Court the complaint alleges that the payments were made to
the Clerk of Said Court as follows:

Estate

Date of Payment

Maule's Estate __________________________________________________________ July 1, 1935
Scowcroft's Estate ______________________________________________ August 27, 1931
Steven's Estate. _________________________________________________________ April 4, 1933
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It is alleged demands were made as follows; and the
record discloses suit was filed in this Court to recover these
sums from Weber County as aforesaid on April 4, 1939.

Date of Demand
Estate
Maule's Estate________ Sept. 1, 1938
Scowcroft's Estate.. Sept. 1, 1938
Steven's Estate ______ :l\Iar. 6, 1939

Date Suit Filed
April 4, 1939
April 4, 1939
April4, 1939

Amount
$325.00
967.00
65.00

It will, therefore, be noticed that the substantial elapsed
time between the date of payment and the date of demand in
each estate is as follows:

Estate
Elapsed Time
Maule's Estate __________________________________________________ 3 years, 2 months
Scowcroft's Estate ________________________________________________ 7 years, 4 days
Steven's Estate __________________________________ s years, 11 months, 2 days
And the substantial lapse of time between date of payment and date of suit filed is as follows:

Estate
Flapsed Time
Maule's Estate ____________________________________ 3 years, 9 months, 3 days
Scowcroft's Estate ______________________________ 7 years, 7 months, 7 days
Steven's Estate ____________________________________________________________________ 6 years
To the second and third causes of action the District
Court ruled that a demand was not the basis of the cause of
action but was merely a step in the administrative procedure
that must be taken within the statutory period of four years.
\Ve quote from the Memorandum Decision of the District
Court as it sets forth the argument in a very learned and
forcible manner:

* * * "The Statute held applicable to the

facts in the San
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Pete County case, which this Court must find is applicable
to the facts in this case is as follows:
"Deductions and Refunds. The board of County Commissioners, upon sufficient evidence being produced
that the property has been erroneously or illegally
assessed, may order the county treasurer to allow the
taxes on that part of the property erroneously or illegally assessed to be deducted before payment of
taxes. Any taxes, interest and costs paid more than
once, or erroneously or illegally collected, may, by
order of the board of county commissioners, be refunded by the county treasurer, and the portion of such
taxes, interest and costs, paid to the state or any taxing
unit, must be refunded to the county, and the proper
officer must draw his warrant therefor in favor of the
county."
But, from reading the San Pete County case it appears to
the Court that the defendant, in the San Pete County case,
urged that the theory of the plaintiff's action was a "demand
under protest" based on the insufficient allegation of the complaint, reading: "but that said payment was not voluntarily
made." (Pg. 563)
And, the Court says:
Pg. 567. "* * * While it is alleged in the complaint
that the taxes in question were 'not voluntarily' paid,
yet is it clear from the facts that they were not paid
under protest as provided by Section 2684."
The purpose of this contention by the defendant, in the
San Pete County case, as it appears to the Court, was to bring
the payment under the general rule as announced under "Taxation" in 26 R. C. L. pg. 455, Para. 411, and referred to in
many citations submitted by counsel in this case, as follows,
namely:
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"In accordance with the general rule governing voluntary payments, a person who voluntarily pays an illegal tax, even though he pays it under considerable
actual pressure, cannot maintain an action to recover
it back."
We do not, at this time, refer to the cited cases based on
this principle because in such cases the rule is applied to stat-

utes peculiar to the state from which the citation comes, which
may introduce complications to a clear understanding of this
case, as no case cited appears to be under a statute the same
as above in which the county can secure a refund as this statute contemplates, which, as, it will be later developed, must
be considered.
At this point the case before the Court presents two
questions:
( 1) Is a demand on the county commissioners a
necessary act giving rise to the cause of action against
a county under Section 80-10-17, Revised Statutes of
1933?
( 2) \Vhen does the statute of limitations begin to
run, from the performance of such act, or from the
date of payment of the illegal tax?
No doubt the answer to either of these cases will solve
the other.
In the San Pete County case the Court's opinion of a four
year statute of limitations is based on the holding in the case
of Mining Co. v. Juab County, 22 Utah 403.
In the San Pete County case the taxes were paid October
22, 1907, and suit filed to recover on February 27, 1911, which
was approximately three years, four months and five days after
payment, and, then the Court says:
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Pg. 574. "* * *Whether under section 2642 the action
must be commenced within four years from the date
the tax is paid or within four years from the date of
the demand we do not decide, because this question is
not raised nor necessary to the decision of this case."
Apparently a close reading will not reveal a demand in the
San Pete County case. In this case the Court speaks of a
"demand" and uses this language:
Pg. 5 72. "* * * But we need not go, nor do we go to
the extent of holding in this case that taxes con{ing
within the purview of section 2642 may be recovered
back without first making a demand therefor upon the
county commissioners. We think that the statute implies such a demand from the fact that it authorizes
the board of commissioners to order the refunding of
the taxes. But we think that it is likewise implied that
the statute does not require more than a demand after
payment, since it is there clearly implied that the order

to refund may be made after the taxes have been apportioned among the several departments of state entitled thereto, and hence provides that such departments must, in turn, refund to the county their proportion. It is clearly contemplated, therefore, that no
protest is necessary, since it is assumed that the refund

is not ordered until after apportionment has been
made."
Because some of the cases treat "claims," "demand" and
"protest" as synonymous, it is difficult to keep in mind that
"claim," "demand" and "protest" are different words and have
different meanings. Each being applicable to a particular
statutory regulation.
The word "claim,' is used in Section 19-10-10, Revised
Statutes of Utah 1933.
The word "demand" is construed into the Statute by the
inLaw
theLibrary.
SanFunding
PeteforCounty
case. by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The word "protest" is used in Section 19-10-11, Revised
Statutes of Utah 1933.
The Court, in the San Pete County case, discussed Section 2684 Laws of Utah 1907, now 80-11-11, Revised Statutes
1933, and held that under Section 2642, Laws of 1907, now
80-10-17, Revised Statutes of 1933 that no "protest" was necessary, and, as stated before, held that Sections 511, 531 and
533 of the 1907 Statutes, now 19-5-23, and 19-11-10 and 1911-11, Revised Statutes of 1933 which had to do with "claims"
were not applicable to the question presented to the Court.
And we find in 14 American Jurisprudence, Title "Counties," Page 228, Par. 65 that:
The word "claim" as ordinarily used in the Statute imparts a matter of charge which is based upon some statute or
grows out of the performance of some authorized contract.
But the Court in the San Pete County case introduces the
word "Demand" and says that Section 2642 of the Laws of
1907, now 80-10-17, as follows:
Pg. 572. ':* * * 'Ve think that the statute implies
(such) a demand from the fact that it authorized the
board of commissioners to arder the refunding of the
tax."
Assuming the statute does so imply a demand. Is such
demand the act giving rise to the cause of action? If so, no
demand appears to have been made in the San Pete County
case.

So the Court in that case did not by example construe a
demand as either a condition precedent or the act giving rise
to the action.
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Consider these illustrations:
ILLUSTRATION I.
In the case of Roxana Petroleum Corp'n v. Bollinger, 54
Fed. Rp. (2nd) pg. 296, it was held:
"Tax payment cannot be recovered if tax paid voluntarily without protest, because the tax might at once
be paid into the State Treasury, and that the State
could not, without its consent be sued to recover the
tax, and that the director of finance would, of course,
not have the money available unless it could be recovered from the sources through which it had been
disbursed."
This situation could not arise under Section 80-10-17,
Revised Statutes of 1933. Therefore, there is no necessity for
a demand either as a condition precedent, or as the act giving
rise to the cause of action.
ILLUSTRATION II.
In the case of First Nat. Bank of Scottsboro v. Jackson
County, 150 Southern, Pg. 690; in commenting upon the tax
set forth in 61 Corpus Juris 1001, and 26 Ruling Case Law
454, the Court states:
"There the taxes were paid to the coliector, under protest, and with written notice that suit would immediately be instituted for its recovery, which was presumably done before any distribution was made."
One of the theories of the demand, claim or protest, is to
protect the tax collecting authority before apportionment and
distribution of the tax money, which, under the laws of some
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

States, cannot be readily recovered, or is actually impossible
to recover after a certain time. But such condition does not
exist in Utah, and, therefore, the necessity for a demand as
a condition precedent does not exist, and hence the demand
does not give rise to a cause of action under Section 80-10-17
Revised Statutes of 1933.
Compilations may be made showing why a "condition
precedent" exists in other jurisdictions, which the illustrations
above reflect; including the class of cases holding:
"Tax payment can not be recovered if the taxpayer
paid the tax voluntarily without intention to question
or resist the tax to recover it back."
But, in Utah, where a tax is erroneously or illegally collected by a county, under the statute upon which plaintiff's
action is predicated, that portion of the tax apportioned among
the several departments of the State may be refunded to the
county upon the proper officer drawing his warrant therefor
in favor of the county.
Another theory for the presentation of a demand, claim
or payment under protest is founded upon the propriety of
giving the county notice of the claim and an opportunity to
pay it without suit. It is designed to protect the board from
importunities of passing on claims before they are presented
in such a way as to be considered intelligent; and to enable
the board to guard against improper charges, and to secure
the taxpayers against abuses in the allowance of claims.
The requirements of the law in this respect range from
the presentation of a demand by a mere written statement or
account giving the nature of the claim and identifying it so as
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to bar another action to the presentation, and filing, of a
formal and authenticated or verified statement.
We do not doubt that the legislature may prescribe conditions under which a County may be sued. But to hold the
Statute under which this action is brought implies a "demand,"
and then to go further and construe that statute so as to make
it a condition under which the County may be sued would in
the opinion of this Court be an unwarranted and improper
construction.
If a demand is necessary to give rise to a cause of action,
there must be some good reason for the making of such demand, and while a demand under the Utah Statute may be
implied, as the Court says in the case of Nelson v. San Pete
County that holding does not imply that such demand is a
necessary act giving rise to a cause of action, but rather is a
demand, as pointed out in the San Pete County case by the
Court, based upon the theory that the law authorizes the
county commissioners to order the refund of the taxes, and
is, therefore; founded upon the propriety of giving the county
commissioners notice of the claim and an opportunity to pay
without suit. No person desires to sue, if payment could be
effected on a demand. * * *

* * * Particular reference is made to the text in 3 7 Corpus
Juris, Page 955, under the title "Limitation of Actions," reading as follows:
"Where, although the cause of action itself has accrued, some preliminary step is required before a resort can be had to the remedy, the condition referring
merely to the remedy and not to the right, the cause
will be barred if not brought within the statutory
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period; therefore the preliminary step must be taken
within that period." * * *
It will be noticed in the San Pete County case that the
suit was brought within the statutory period of four years,
and the court did not find that the "demand'' referred to in
that decision, as being implied in Section 2642 Laws of 1907,
now 80-10-17, Revised Statutes 1933 was the act giving rise
to that action.

And a demand which has no such basis cannot be the
subject of a claim within the meaning of the law, even though
allowed as such, although a demand may be made for certain
administrative purposes, as referred to above, such a demand
is not required before resort can be had to the remedy.
The demand the court has read into this statute cannot
in our opinion possibly be the act giving rise to the cause of
action, and its presentation, if necessary, is but part of the
procedure for administrative purposes, and to perfect the
cause of action, and is not the act giving rise to the cause
of action, from which alone the limitation of the statute must
be measured. (See \Vhite v. King County, 174 Pac. 3)
It was held in the case of Swing v. Barnard-Cope Mfg.
Co., etc., 131 N.\V. Page 855, as follows:

"* * * 1. Limitation of Actions-Accrual of CauseConditions Precedent-Notice. \Vhere a condition precedent to the right to sue on a cause of action is not
a part of the cause of action, but merely a part of or
one step in the remedy, it does not delay the running
of the statute of limitations." * * *
Therefore, the Court holds that the Statute of Limitations runs from the date of payment." * * * (End of quote.)
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If a payment under protest is necessary to recover in
these causes of action then surely the plaintiff must lose as
to each and every one of them. But if payment under protest
is not necessary then most certainly a demand is not necessary
for the accrual of the cause of action, but only a preliminary
step that is required before resort may be had to the remedy,
the condition referring merely to the remedy and not to the
right. People v. Cal. Safe Co., et al, 189 P 289, 37 CJ 955.
See also: White v. King County (Wash.) 174 P. 3; Neal
Young Bond Co. v. Mitchell County (C Tex app) 54 SW 284;
Swing v. Barnard-Cope Mfg. Co. (Minn.) 131 NW 855;
Baker v. Johnson County, 43 Iowa 645.

We are definitely of the opinion that this court committed
itself to the proposition that a demand is not necessary to the
accrual of the cause of action a long time ago. Because in
Auerbach v. Salt Lake County, 23 U 103, 63 P 907, there is
the following headnote:
"5. Claim against County: Presentment for Payment
Before Suit Not Required. There being no statute in
this State which expressly prohibits the bringing of an
action on a claim against a county before a duly itemized and verified statement has been presented to the
board of county commissioners, an objection that the
complaint does not allege the presentation and rejection of such a claim, being raised for the first time in
this court, can not avail the defendant; such an objection being simply in abatement of the action, to
have effect, must be urged by proper plea, or in some
other appropriate manner in the trial court, or it will
be regarded as waived."
We agree definitely with the lower court that this court
did not consider that a demand was necessary for the accrual
of the cause of action in the Neilson v. San Pete County case.
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And we are forced to admit that we cannot see any similarity
in the instant case and Espanda v. Ogden State Bank, 7S U
117. The statute that governs that case, Comp. Laws of Utah,
1917, para. 6478, now R. S. U. 1933, 104-2-24, expressly says
there is no limitation against recovery of Bank deposits.
We now come to the case of State Tax Commission v.
Spanish Fork-U-100 P 2nd 575, upon which the plaintiff
so thoroughly relies. Again we must confess that we utterly
fail in being able to follow the plaintiff's logic in maintaining
that case is in their favor. To us, if it supports either side it
is our side. Both cases are alike in this-they are founded
upon a statutory liability.
But they are distinguishable in this-that the Spanish
Fork case was controlled by special statutes that made the
accrual of the cause of action contingent upon a certain condition. That condition was the filing of a report. And the
statute expressly provides a way for the Tax Commission to
file the report in case the vendor-taxpayer fails to do so.
The Court held in the Spanish Fork case that it was the
filing of the return that started the Statute to run, not the
demand. The Court says:
"To the contention that the Tax Commission by delay
in filing a return for the Tax debtor when he failed to
file one for himself, may thus postpone the running of
the statute, the ready answer lies that the vendortaxpayer could have prevented such a result by filing
the return." (Italics supplied.)
The case definitely holds that the demand was merely a
step in or a part of the remedy and not a part of the cause of
action. Because the Court figured (Page 576, paragraphs 3
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and 4) the time of starting the running of the statute from
August 13, 1936, the time of filing the return, instead of September 18, 1936, the date of demand.
Plaintiff's allusion to relief under 104-54-14, R. S. U.
1933, takes one's mind into the realms of fantasy where logic
and reason fade into oblivion as completely as the "Lost
Tribes of Israel."
Plaintiff's argument that he should be paid because of his
bald statement that since Smith v. Carbon County, many counties have voluntarily paid like claims, is met with an equally
bald statement, many counties have not, and may we note
that the State of Utah has refused to return any money received from inheritance taxes on Union Pacific stock which
the U. S. Supreme Court held it had no right to collect, where
demand was made for return more than one year after
payment.
The Court need not lean over to extend a helping hand
to the plaintiff and others in a like position. It was the wealthy estates that paid the large fees. They employed the best
counsel and paid liberal fees for their counsel, while the
County officers were never picked because of their knowledge
of the law. The officers had a right to assume that the Legislature passed valid laws.
We submit that neither the plaintiff nor any other person
should be allowed to triumph over the Statute of Limitations
either through his laches or his delict. We still are of the
opinion that this being a liability created by statute that it
is governed by the statute which required the tax to be paid
under protest and suit should have been started on the defendSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ant's cause of action within at least one year from the date
of the payment.
For the reasons set forth in our briefs we respectfully submit that the trial Court erred in overruling defendant's demurrers to plaintiff's first cause of action and rendering judgment on that cause in favor of the plaintiff. \Ve believe that
the plaintiff's first cause of action does not state facts sufficient
to justify the relief granted. \Ve further maintain that the
trial Court did not err in holding the plaintiff's second and
third causes of action were barred by the Statute of Limitations and we submit that this Court should reverse the lower
Court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the first cause of
action and should sustain the lower Court's judgment dismissing plaintiff's second and third causes of action and remand
the case with instructions to take appropriate procedure in
accordance therewith.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN A. HENDRICKS,
GLENN W. ADAMS,
Attorneys for Defendant,
Weber County.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

